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Introduction  
South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons program in 1991, chemical and biological warfare 
program in 1993, and missile program in 1994 and became a “disarmament trendsetter” in 
bringing to signature an “African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone” in 1995 and compromise in 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conferences in 1995, 2000, and 2005. Despite the 
South African government’s continuing commitment to WMD nonproliferation and arms export 
controls, several issues related to WMD proliferation remain. This paper examines proliferation 
problems and transnational networks that are tied to South Africa’s history as a developer of 
weapons of mass destruction and other weapons during the apartheid era (1948-1994). The 
problem of nuclear proliferation is examined through the lens of the recent A.Q. Khan case and 
involvement by a South African network. The problem of biological weapons proliferation is 
illustrated through the recent case of Dr. Daan Goosen—a key scientist in the 1980s biological 
warfare program (Project Coast) and the former director of the Roodepoort Research 
Laboratories. The problem of terrorism and transnational networks is examined using evidence of 
al-Qaeda activities and those of related groups in South Africa. Links are drawn between WMD 
proliferation supply and terrorist networks and indications and warning of WMD terrorism 
emanating from South Africa are examined.  
The A.Q. Khan Network in South Africa and Nuclear Supply Networks 
The September 2004 discovery of a South African connection to A.Q. Khan’s nuclear proliferation 
network led to the arrests of four business and engineering figures, including some who had been 
involved in the former apartheid regime’s nuclear weapons program of the 1970s and 1980s. 
South African police arrested Johan Meyer of Tradefin Engineering on suspicion of manufacturing 
centrifuge parts and equipment for Libya. Tradefin produced the elaborate equipment needed to 
insert and withdraw the uranium hexafluoride gas that is enriched in centrifuges. Tradefin also 
attempted unsuccessfully to make the sensitive maraging steel rotors for the P2 centrifuges.[1]  
Meyer admitted to prosecutors that he knew that the items were for a uranium-enrichment plant. 
Based on his testimony, other individuals were arrested, including Gerhard Wisser, a German 
citizen and owner of Krisch Engineering in South Africa, who had a long history of involvement 
with other members of the network. Wisser had been arrested a month earlier in Germany for his 
alleged role in producing centrifuge parts in South Africa for delivery to Libya and was out on bail 
in South Africa.[2]  
Daniel Jacobus Van Beek, director of South Africa's counter-proliferation office, participated in the 
raid and called the scheme “one of the most serious and extensive attempts” to breach 
international nuclear controls.[3] The activities took place in spite of the fact that South Africa has 
one of the world's strictest anti-proliferation laws, with severe sentences and financial penalties 
for violators. Van Beek estimated that the 200 tons of equipment was worth about $33 million.[4]  
In November 2004, the Swiss government arrested Gotthard Lerch, a German citizen, who had 
been employed by Leybold Heraeus, a German company that developed and produced vacuum 
products and technology. Before undergoing internal reform in the early 1990s, Leybold Heraeus 
and its sister companies had been major suppliers to many secret nuclear weapons programs, 
including the one in South Africa as well as in Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. A Malaysian police report 
mentioned that Lerch was allegedly involved in trying to obtain centrifuge parts for Libya from 
South Africa. Germany asked Switzerland to arrest Lerch so that he would not be free when 
Wisser was released on bail by South African authorities.[5]  
The A.Q. Khan arrests underscored the fact that South Africa still has a domestic nuclear energy 
program and the kind of sophisticated manufacturing machinery, expertise, and industrial 
infrastructure sought by states and organizations seeking to build nuclear weapons. The Khan 
case shattered the complacency in South Africa and elsewhere about how effective national and 
international export controls have been in stopping illegal nuclear or nuclear-related materials. 
South Africa is a Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) member, but investigations have shown that the 
government did not adequately implement its national export control and nuclear nonproliferation 
laws, despite its commitments as a NSG member.[6] South Africa’s NSG membership enabled 
companies assisting the Khan network to receive items from other NSG members essentially 
without checks on their potential end use. The failure of this NSG country to stop the illicit 
manufacture of centrifuge components is one of the most embarrassing aspects of this scandal. 
Thus, South Africa remains a major source of concern in terms of nuclear supply networks and 
indications and warning of nuclear terrorism.  
The Goosen Case and South African Biological Weapons Supply Networks 
Concerns about biological weapons proliferation originating from South Africa escalated with the 
publication of a series of articles in the Washington Post in April 2003. The articles revealed that 
in early 2002 Dr. Daan Goosen had offered an entire collection of pathogens, including 
genetically modified pathogens, to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in exchange for 
$5 million U.S. dollars and immigration permits for 19 associates and their families. While 
personal financial motives were the primary motive of these former Project Coast scientists, their 
spokesperson, Dr. Goosen, claimed that they had decided to approach the FBI after receiving 
overtures by several foreigners who were interested in purchasing biological pathogens. These 
foreigners included “a German treasure-hunter and a man claiming to be an Arab sheik’s 
agent.”[7]  
The fears of many analysts and policymakers were confirmed by this incident involving scientists, 
who were experiencing problems making a living in the new South Africa. They had retained 
specimens and documents that were suppose to have been destroyed in 1993 and were 
insinuating that they would sell their biological warfare expertise and genetically modified 
biological agents to the highest bidder, if guaranteed employment was not forthcoming. Even 
more questions were raised a few months after the Washington Post interview, when Dr. Goosen 
claimed that his group of scientists had informed South African officials that the group had 
retained proscribed biological agents in their homes. Goosen claims that South African 
government officials took DNA fingerprints but allowed the scientists to retain the biological 
agents.[8]  
The revelations in the South African case reconfirm warnings made by proliferation and terrorist 
experts that arms control approaches, designed to limit the spread of nuclear, biological, and 
chemical (NBC) weapons of mass destruction, have failed to address newer WMD proliferation 
threats.[9] The South African case underscores several complicated longer-term WMD 
proliferation concerns associated with NBC rollback. Recent efforts by a variety of actors to 
acquire biological agents in South Africa and the still largely unexplained links of American micro-
biologists to Project Coast illustrate why there is concern about the acquisition and use of 
biological weapons by individuals, small groups, or networks of groups for a variety of reasons, 
long after the official state program is eliminated.  
A more enduring set of concerns relates to the possibility of illegal sale of arms, components of 
WMD weapons or expertise that were developed by scientists and engineers who worked on one 
or more of South Africa’s weapons of mass destruction or missile programs. One group of Project 
Coast scientists has made efforts of to obtain work in the United States. There have also been 
reports of another group of former weapons scientists who also retained pathogens from covert 
programs and have recently threatened the government that they too will sell their expertise 
abroad if they do not receive adequate compensation from the South African government. Since 
the mid-1990s, there have been concerns expressed by both Americans and South African 
government officials about what former Project Coast scientists would do for a living in South 
Africa and what they might do if they immigrated to various parts of the world.[10]  
Missile and Conventional Weapons Proliferation Threat 
Some weapon scientists who worked on missile programs have also been the subjects of 
proliferation concern. In 2000, South African engineer allegedly sold weapons secrets to Pakistan, 
helping overcome restrictions on arms sales imposed since the 1999 coup by General Pervez 
Musharraf. An air weapons specialist was tried on 21 counts that ranged from fraud to theft to 
contraventions of several laws, including the Armscor Act and the Copyright Act.[11] The 
regularity of these reports indicates that unemployed scientists and engineers are likely to remain 
a source of problems and possible proliferation threats for the South African government, and for 
concerned outsiders such as the United States, for years to come.  
Conventional weapons proliferation is also a concern. These weapons were developed at the 
same time and by many of the same scientists and engineers who worked on South Africa’s 
nuclear weapons and missile programs. With the rise of concerns about the interest of al Qaeda 
and affiliated terrorist groups in obtaining weapons of mass destruction and radiation bombs, 
there have been parallel concerns about the same groups seeking ways to enhance conventional 
bombs. In the 1970s and 1980s, South African scientists developed a small fuel air bomb that 
could saturate a 2-meter roof of a bunker, and a flag bomb, which is a deflagration bomb that is 
based on the same principles as a thermalberic warhead.[12]  
Final work on these bombs was conducted at a time when South African weapon designers were 
still working on missiles. South Africa weapons researchers started developing many of these 
new conventional bombs, because they were unable to buy new types of bombs from foreign 
suppliers due to end users restrictions in place since the late 1970s. For example, a precision 
guided munition, named the Kentron Raptor-1, was developed in the late 1970s. Later, South 
African weapon builders decided to finalize new conventional bombs rather than focus their 
efforts on developing biological and chemical warheads because the latter were prohibited by 
international conventions.  
At the time South Africa developed a fuel air bomb in the early 1980s. Only three other 
countries—the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union—were known to have 
deployed them. The defense company, Mechem, manufactured the warhead while Somchem 
developed a liquid explosive for the bomb. The bomb was not ready for use until the end of the 
war in Angola in 1988. However, a prototype fuel air bomb was used in counter-insurgency 
campaigns against SWAPO rebels in South West Africa (Namibia). By the time the fuel air bomb 
program was stopped in 1989, the bomb could be demonstrated but did not have a rocket 
available to deliver it.  
In recent years, there has been a lot of interest in South Africa's cluster, fuel air, and flag bombs 
by governments and organizations around the world. One reason for the high demand is because 
it is difficult to build a fuel air bomb and get the right mix of fuels. A flag bomb is easier to make, 
as it is an enhanced normal explosive. This characteristic makes a pseudo fuel bomb, which uses 
TNT, an attractive terrorist weapon that could cause a great deal more damage than the 
conventional bombs used in recent terrorist attacks in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and elsewhere. 
Despite the high demand for these conventional bombs, the South African government has 
adhered to international prohibitions related to conventional arms sales. After the September 11, 
2001 attack in the United States, the South African government, like other governments 
worldwide, reviewed its arms sales polices to be sure that they were strict enough to ensure that 
terrorists could not purchase these more exotic bombs or a host of other weapons systems 
developed in conjunction with the former nuclear and missile programs, that is gravity bombs, 
atomic demolition munitions, low-yield miniaturized devices for artillery pieces, and tactical 
standoff weapons.  
Al-Qaeda Networks in South Africa and WMD Supply Networks 
al-Qaeda and its local affiliates have increased their presence in South Africa over the past 
decade. U.S. and South African authorities now worry about the possibility that radical Islamic 
groups will succeed in efforts to obtain WMD components, materials or expertise from South 
Africa; that al Qaeda or affiliate cells will be established and spread in South Africa; and that al 
Qaeda or affiliates will increasingly be successful in efforts to recruit new foot soldiers from 
among the poor and disaffected youths in poor Muslim neighborhoods in several cities in South 
Africa.  
Extensive press coverage of documents seized at al-Qaeda camps in the mountains of 
Afghanistan by U.S. military personnel in 2002 alerted many in the informed public to the fact that 
al-Qaeda members had been interested in obtaining or building a nuclear bomb or enhanced 
radiation device. Moreover, reports posted on the NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database website note 
that the CIA had been intercepting messages throughout the 1990s that indicated that al-Qaeda 
members were trying to obtain a nuclear weapon in order to carry out a plan for a “Hiroshima” 
against America. Several African countries, including South Africa, were targeted by terrorists as 
possible locations where materials or components for a WMD device could be obtained.[13]  
Evidence for this claim came from a grand jury that indicted accused terrorists in New York in 
2001. The U.S. Department of Justice indictment of individuals accused of being involved in the 
1998 bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, noted that, “at various times at 
least since early 1993, Osama bin Laden and other known and unknown terrorists made efforts to 
obtain the components of nuclear weapons.”[14] According to press accounts, the indictments 
provided evidence from a former al-Qaeda member of attempts by group members to buy 
uranium of South African origin. These efforts were in addition to other efforts to buy a complete 
warhead or weapons-usable materials from Central Asian states or from Chechen criminal groups 
in a money-and drug in exchange for nuclear weapons deal.[15]  
Additional details about al Qaeda’s efforts to obtain WMD materials came from the testimony of 
the suspected al Qaeda terrorists before the New York grand jury. Testimony was taken from 
each of the alleged conspirators in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania, which killed 224 people. However, one suspect who turned states evidence (named 
Fadl) provided a detailed account of how the group’s desire to acquire chemical weapons and 
uranium for an atomic bomb brought them into contact with officials in Sudan. Fadl testified that 
his group expressed their interest in buying chemical weapons and told how a Sudanese military 
officer had offered to sell uranium to al Qaeda for $1.5 million. Fadl claimed that the Sudanese 
military officer showed the bin Laden’s agents a two-foot cylinder that purportedly contained the 
fissile material, along with documents that were allegedly from South Africa. Fadl said he 
received a $10,000 bonus for arranging the sale but did not know whether it was ever 
consummated. Nor did he know whether the cylinder held bomb-grade uranium, leaving open the 
strong possibility that the deal was a scam.[16]  
Even more attention was directed towards South Africa by U.S. authorities since the November 
2002 suicide bombing in Kenya. A previously unknown group, the Army of Palestine, claimed 
responsibility for the attack and a failed missile attack on an Israeli airliner. The 2002 attack, 
along with the bombings of the U.S. embassy in Kenya in 1998, were interpreted by U.S. and 
South African officials as the work of al-Qaeda and affiliate groups. Concerns were expressed in 
both countries about the possibility that South Africa (along with several other African states) was 
being used as, “potential breeding grounds, as well as safe havens for terrorist networks.”[17] 
South African officials acknowledged that al-Qaeda operatives may have been operating out of 
South Africa for years. The main concern of authorities in the United States and South Africa 
governments was the possibility that several militant Islamic organizations were smuggling gold, 
diamonds and cash via Durban and Mozambique to Pakistan and Dubai. President Mbeki also 
warned the pubic that al-Qaeda operatives might be establishing a presence in South Africa after 
the September 11. 2001 attacks in the United States. Mbeki noted that the success of American 
and European authorities in routing out al-Qaeda cells in other countries, may have led many 
members of these covert networks to find new bases.[18]  
In the same statement, Mbeki acknowledged that after the 1998 bomb blast at Planet Hollywood 
in Cape Town, the South African National Intelligence Agency had warned him that foreign 
Islamic extremists were hiding in South Africa.[19]  
The seriousness of warnings about al-Qaeda in South Africa acquired more credence after 
Khamis Khalfan Mohamed, an al-Qaeda operative from Tanzania who was allegedly involved in 
the 1998 bombing of the American Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam, took refuge in South Africa before 
he was arrested in Cape Town and extradited to the United States.  
There have also been several public reports in recent years that al-Qaeda and other Islamic 
extremists are using South Africa as a base from where they can regroup, raise and launder 
money, and plan more terror attacks. The United States and authorities in other Western states 
remain concerned about the prospect of terrorists using South Africa as a base of operations. The 
country has a world-class banking system and stock market, a modern telecommunication 
system, good road and rail network system and broad civil liberties, all of which makes it easy to 
move people and money. There were reports that al-Qaeda was buying gold and diamonds to 
make it more difficult to trace the organization's wealth in Africa. In 2002, Mohamed Suleman 
Vaid and his wife Moshena of Durban were arrested at a Swazi border post with more than 1 
million rand hidden in their clothing. Vaid denied that the money was meant for al-Qaeda, but 
authorities claimed that the money was on its way to a Mozambique citizen with al-Qaeda 
connections.[20]  
In recent years, the South African government has responded to the growing presence of radical 
Islamic terrorist groups. For example, to better cope with these allegations South African special 
police unit, the Scorpions, have increased their cooperation and coordination with their role model, 
the FBI. The Scorpions have also increased their cooperation with counterpart at similar 
investigative services in several Europe and Asian countries.  
In the past two years, the South African National Intelligence Agency and the South African 
Secret Service and the Ministry of Home Affairs have uncovered a terrorist ring and funding for 
terrorists in South Africa.[21] There is considerable activity, including trafficking and falsifying 
documents, as well as the funding of mosques and madrassas.[22] The July 2005 London 
bombings have been traced to this ring. Islamic radicalism and terrorist support networks are 
concentrated in Fordsburg, a southern suburb of Johannesburg, and in Durban, and the more 
affluent communities appear the most susceptible to radical Islam. Saudis, Iranians, and 
Pakistanis have been providing money to fund radical Islamic groups in South Africa.[23]  
Conclusion 
The existence of proliferation networks in South Africa alongside terrorist networks are a cause 
for concern. The possibility exists that WMD and related materials have been or will be offered for 
sale in South Africa to al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks with a presence in South Africa. 
Thus far, there is no evidence that the proliferation and terrorist networks have intersected. There 
is also the issue of what al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations would do if they were able to 
obtain sophisticated WMD devices and materials, such as centrifuges and weapons-grade 
anthrax. The prospects for states, such as Iran, acquiring WMD devices and materials are greater, 
as is the possibility that those types of states will pass on WMD to terrorist organizations. 
Therefore, South Africa will remain a subject of scrutiny for some time to come in order to provide 
indications and warnings of WMD terrorism. 
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